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Introduction
Environmental policy gives polluting …rms an incentive to …nd cleaner ways of producing.
There is a large literature on the e¤ect of environmental policy on innovation (see e.g. Requate (2005) for an overview) starting from Kneese and Schultze (1978) . One question that has received relatively little attention is: When environmental policy becomes stricter and stricter, will …rms invest more and more in environmental R&D to reduce their emission-to-output ratio? Our immediate intuition might suggest that this should be the case. However, making production cleaner is only one of two ways in which …rms can respond to stricter environmental policy. The other way is to reduce output. This in turn reduces …rms'incentives to use cleaner production methods. If a …rm will produce very little because of a very strict environmental policy, it also has little incentive to invest in environmental R&D. This suggests that when output is decreasing in the strictness of environmental policy, the emissions-to-output ratio might be a U-shaped function of strictness. However, the e¤ects might conceivably also be reversed: When an ever stricter environmental policy prompts a …rm to invest more and more in environmental R&D, production might eventually become so clean that it starts to increase again.
In the present paper we study the e¤ects of the strictness of environmental policy on output and on the incentives to install cleaner technology. We start with a very general formulation of the …rm's environmental technology, with end-of-pipe and integrated technology as two speci…c cases. With end-of-pipe technology, where a …rm can reduce its absolute emission level by a certain amount, we …nd that emission intensity as well as output is decreasing throughout in strictness. With integrated technology, where a …rm can reduce its emissions-to-output ratio to a certain level, either output or emission intensity is U-shaped in strictness.
As Perino and Requate (2012) have shown, the question of whether a stricter environmental policy induces more investment in environmental R&D is linked with the recent literature on pivoting Marginal Abatement Costs (M AC) curves. Traditionally it has been assumed that environmental innovation reduces M AC at any level of emissions. In these models, a stricter environmental policy leads to more environmental innovation (e.g. Bréchet and Jouvet (2008) show that a decrease in the marginal emission intensity of "dirty" inputs leads to a clockwise rotation or pivoting of the M AC curve: it is lower for higher emission levels, but higher for lower emission levels. 5 While these three papers take the output response of a …rm into account, they do so in a very simpli…ed manner. They only consider one …rm faced with a constant output price.
In our paper we endogenize the output market, which makes it much more di¢ cult to de…ne a M AC function.
While the literature that introduced pivoting M AC curves took environmental innovation as exogenous, we examine how this a¤ects the incentives for innovation. On this subject, Perino and Requate (2012) have shown that when the M AC curve pivots clockwise, adoption of a clean technology is U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy. 6 The authors assume that there is a continuum of small …rms that can choose between two technologies and they do not model the output market explicitly.
Bréchet and Meunier's (2012) analysis of an integrated technology does consider the output market. Otherwise their model is similar to Perino and Requate (2012) , with …rms choosing between two technologies. Bréchet and Meunier (2012) also …nd that adoption of a clean technology is U-shaped in the strictness of environmental policy.
There is an earlier literature that explicitly takes the output market into account. 7 Ulph (1997) sets up a free-entry Cournot duopoly model with constant marginal cost of production and an integrated abatement technology, treating the environmental tax rate as an exogenous variable. Ulph (1997) derives conditions under which an increase in the tax rate reduces output. He …nds that the e¤ect of the tax rate on R&D spending is am- 5 Baker et al. (2010) …nd that the M AC curve pivots by assuming that Total Abatement Cost decreases for all levels of abatement except for complete abatement of all emissions. 6 Endres and Friehe (2011) examine the e¤ects of environmental liability law on the incentives to di¤use advanced abatement technology that reduces M AC everywhere or pivots the M AC curve clockwise. 7 A related research strand focuses on environmental innovation in the context of international trade, showing the ambiguous e¤ect of domestic emission taxation (Ulph and Ulph, 1996; Simpson and Bradford, 1993; Feess and Muehlheusser, 2002). biguous. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) set up a Cournot oligopoly with technology spillovers, where the government taxes emissions and subsidizes R&D. The authors'conclusion that the e¤ect of the tax rate on output is ambiguous is in accordance with Ulph's (1997) …ndings. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) further …nd that R&D spending is increasing in the tax rate.
The model in our paper is similar to Perino and Requate (2012) and Bréchet and Meunier (2012) , however there are some crucial di¤erences. Most importantly, whereas Perino and Requate (2012) and Bréchet and Meunier (2012) model the …rm's choice between two technologies, we model the technology choice as continuous. This explains why we …nd that either emission intensity or output is U-shaped in strictness, while Perino and Requate (2012) and Bréchet and Meunier (2012) …nd that emission intensity is always U-shaped and output is decreasing in the strictness of the policy.
Furthermore, unlike Perino and Requate (2012) we explicitly take the output market into account. With Cournot competition, emission taxation does not implement the social optimum. However, we …nd that in the social optimum as well, either output or emission intensity is U-shaped in strictness. This shows that the U-shapes are not due to some kind of policy or market failure.
Finally, unlike Perino and Requate (2012) and Bréchet and Meunier (2012) we take the interaction between individual …rms'M AC curves into account. The literature until now has assumed that a …rm's M AC curve only depends on its own choice of technology. However, with integrated technology and output market interactions, one …rm's technology choice a¤ect the other …rms'M AC curves. When one …rm chooses a cleaner technology, this reduces its e¤ective tax rate on output. This …rm will produce more, which depresses the product price for all other …rms, shifting their M AC curves downward. Because of the interaction between …rms'individual M ACs, we …nd it useful to work with a more aggregate concept of the M AC. With emission taxation, we de…ne the Aggregate Marginal Abatement Cost for the whole industry. In the social optimum, the Social Marginal Abatement Cost includes the whole industry as well as the consumer surplus.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model.
We analyze emission taxation in Section 3 and the welfare optimum in Section 4. Since we cannot obtain clear-cut results for the integrated technology in general, we analyze this technology in more detail with speci…c functional forms deriving M AC curves in Section 5. The concluding Section 6 discusses the implications for policy and empirical work.
The model
There are n identical …rms producing a homogeneous good. We shall mainly focus on imperfect (Cournot) competition between …rms, but we will also discuss results for perfect competition and for a perfectly elastic market demand function. Firm i; i = 1; ; n; producing q i faces the inverse demand function P (Q), where Q P n i=1 q i ; P 0 0 and:
Production is polluting. Firm i's total emissions e i are given by:
where " i 2 [0; 1] is the emissions-to-output ratio, which depends on the abatement technology that the …rm installs. If the …rm does not spend anything on abatement, " i = 1:
The …rm's cost function is C(q i ; " i ) with C q (0; " i ) = 0 and C q > 0 for q i > 0; C " (q i ; 1) = 0; C " < 0 for " i 2 [0; 1); C q" 0; C> 0; C "" > 0 and:
Our assumption C " (q i ; 1) = 0 implies that a …rm will reduce " i even when environmental policy is very lenient (McKitrick, 1999) . C q" 0 means that reducing the emissionto-output ratio becomes more expensive (or at least not cheaper) as output rises.
Finally we impose:
In addition to this general formulation of a …rm's cost function, we shall consider two speci…c abatement technologies: integrated and end-of-pipe. With integrated technology 8 Gaudet and Salant (1991) introduced condition (1) to ensure uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium.
(previously analyzed by Ulph, 1997) , when a …rm wants to reduce its emission-to-output ratio to " i , it has to spend an amount F (" i ) which does not depend on the output level.
The cost function is then:
with k 0 (0) = 0 and k 0 > 0 for q i > 0; k 00 > 0; F 0 (1) = 0 and F 0 (" i ) < 0 for " i 2 [0; 1);
Note that this cost function features C q" (q i ; " i ) = 0: Examples of integrated abatement technologies are those which allow …rms to be more energy e¢ cient in their production processes. In the steel and iron industry, one of the largest industrial sources of CO 2 emissions, examples of such technologies are coke dry quenching and top pressure recovery turbines (Carpenter, 2012) .
With end-of-pipe technology, when a …rm wants to reduce its emissions by the absolute amount r i ; it has to spend an amount V (r i ) which does not depend on the output level:
The cost function in this case is:
where:
with k 0 (0) = 0 and k We will focus our attention on symmetric equilibria only. When analyzing emission taxation under imperfect competition, we assume that is high enough to guarantee a positive tax rate (t > 0).
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Firm i's pro…ts i can be written as:
where (q i ; " i ) denotes the …rm's operating pro…ts, i.e. its pro…ts net of the tax payment.
The policy maker or regulator's objective is to maximize welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus and operating pro…ts, minus environmental damage. It can also be written as the utility from the good (the area below the inverse demand function) minus production cost and environmental damage, i.e.:
W (q 1 ; ; q n ; " 1 ; ; " n ; ) =
Emission taxation
With emission taxation, the regulator sets the tax rate in stage one. In stage two, all …rms simultaneously choose their emission-to-output ratio " i and its output level q i .
In stage two, each …rm i maximizes its pro…ts i in (9) . The …rst order conditions with respect to q i and " i respectively are:
When product market demand is perfectly elastic [P 0 (Q) = 0] and under perfect competition where each …rm takes the product price as given; (11) turns into:
Returning to the general case, if there is no environmental policy (t = 0), then C " = 0 from (12): In this case " = 1 and we denote the pro…t-maximizing output level by q t ;
which from (11) is implicitly de…ned by:
The second order condition for pro…t maximization is that the matrix
is negative semide…nite. We shall make the slightly stronger assumption that xx is negative de…nite. This implies that h xx h 0 < 0 for all vectors h and the determinant is positive:
Under perfect competition, (16) becomes:
Totally di¤erentiating (11) and (12) with respect to t yields:
Solving for dq i =dt and d" i =dt we …nd:
Since the denominator is positive by (1) and (16), the sign of (20) and (21), as well as of (22) below, is the sign of the numerator on the RHS. We cannot sign dq i =dt and d" i =dt unambiguously, but we can show that emissions are decreasing in the tax rate. From (20) and (21):
The sign follows from the fact that using (15) , the numerator can be written as:
where the inequality follows from (1) and setting h = q i " i in h xx h 0 < 0 because xx in (15) is negative de…nite. In stage one, the regulator sets the tax rate that maximizes welfare. In the symmetric case where q i = q and " i = " for all i = 1; ; n; welfare (10) can be written as:
Writing welfare as a function of t and , the …rst order condition with respect to is:
Using the implicit function theorem we …nd:
The second equality follows from (24) . The inequality follows from D E > 0; dE=dt < 0 by (22) and @ 2 W=@t 2 < 0 as the SOC for welfare maximization. Thus an increase in will prompt the regulator to raise the tax rate. This means that the signs of dq=d and d"=d are the signs of dq=dt and d"=dt respectively.
Returning to (20) and (21) and setting the tax rate very low (close to zero), the numerators on the RHS become respectively:
The second inequality follows from (1), P 0 0 and C> 0. Thus when the tax rate is very low, both q i and " i are decreasing in t: In order to make more de…nite statements on the e¤ect of t on q i and " i ; let us look at the two special cases of environmental technology introduced in Section 2: end-of-pipe and integrated abatement technology.
End-of-pipe technology
With end-of-pipe technology (7), …rm i's pro…t function (9) becomes:
The …rst order conditions with respect to q i and r i are, respectively:
We see that the FOC (26) for output q i does not feature abatement r i : Thus if …rm i changes its abatement technology r i (for instance because V (r i ) falls), this will not a¤ect its output level. This is because the …rm's e¤ective tax rate t on output is not a¤ected by its abatement technology. 
Marginal abatement cost, de…ned for a given level of r i ; is then:
Note that …rm i's M AC depends on the other …rms'output choices, but not on their abatement technology, since (as we have seen) a …rm's choice of abatement technology does not a¤ect its output choice. 10 An alternative de…nition of M AC keeps …rm i's output constant at the level q i implicitly de…ned by (26) and sets M AC(e i ) = @ (q i ; r i )=@r i = V 0 (r i ): However, this alternative de…nition is not compatible with the de…nition used in the "pivoting M AC" literature.
The M AC curve can be drawn as a function of e i for given levels of r i and Q i : Let us now examine the horizontal shift in the M AC curve when r i changes. That is, we wish to determine how e i changes with r i for a given level of M AC: Setting the total di¤erential of (28) with respect to r i equal to zero yields:
The …rst term between square brackets is negative by (1) Returning to (26) and (27), totally di¤erentiating them with respect to t yields:
The inequalities follow from the second order conditions and (1): For the emissionsto-output ratio " i = 1
, we …nd:
The inequality follows from (29) and (30) . Thus with an end-of-pipe technology; both q i and " i are monotonically decreasing in t. Given that the optimal tax rate is increasing in , as shown in (25), we can state that both q i and " i are decreasing in .
Integrated technology
With integrated technology (6), …rm i's …rst order conditions (11) and (12) in stage two are, respectively:
In contrast to (26) for end-of-pipe technology, the FOC (31) for output under integrated technology does feature the abatement technology parameter (here " i ): A cleaner technology decreases the e¤ective tax rate t" i on output and will thus prompt the …rm to produce more.
Since C q" = 0 with integrated technology, equations (20) and (21) become:
The denominator is positive, as in (20) and (21). The signs of (33) and (34) are thus the signs of the numerators on the respective RHSs. Substituting (32) into (33), dq i =dt < 0 if and only if:
According to Ulph (1997) , dq i =dt < 0 if and only if:
This is equivalent to our condition (35). 
Thus while " i is decreasing towards zero for ever stricter environmental policy, q i is increasing. Indeed from (31) with " i ! 0; q i approaches the output level q t without environmental policy, as de…ned by (14) .
By (2) and (5), when q i goes to zero, (34) becomes:
Thus while q i is decreasing towards zero for ever stricter environmental policy, " i is increasing. Indeed from (32) with q i ! 0; " i approaches unity again: the …rm does not spend anything on reducing the emissions-to-output ratio. 11 The proof is as follows. Di¤erentiating both sides of the equation
Di¤erentiating both sides of this equation with respect to F again yields
In Section 5, we will explore the behavior of the emission-to-output ratio and output for any tax rate, determining the conditions under which either is non-monotonic, for a speci…c integrated technology.
Summary
To summarize the results from this section, we state:
12 Proposition 1 With emission taxation:
1. The optimal tax rate t is increasing in the environmental damage parameter ;
2. Emissions E are decreasing in t, and consequently in ;
3. When t is very low, both output q and emission intensity " are decreasing in t, and consequently in ;
4. With integrated technology, when t is very high so that E is close to zero:
(a) When " is close to zero, q is increasing in t, and consequently in :
(b) When q is close to zero, " is increasing in t, and consequently in :
5. With end-of-pipe technology, q is decreasing and emission reduction r is increasing in t; so that " is decreasing in t: This implies that q and " are decreasing in , while r is increasing in :
4 The welfare optimum
In this section, we will show that the non-monotonic behaviour of the emission-to-output ratio or output is not due to market failure. To that purpose, we will solve the welfare optimum w, where the regulator chooses " i and q i ; i = 1; ; n; to maximize welfare. As …rms are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric outcome where q i = q and " i = " for all i = 1; ; n: The …rst order conditions are, from (23):
Comparing (37) and (38) to (11) and (12), we see that the regulator cannot implement the welfare optimum with imperfect competition. However, when P 0 = 0 and under perfect competition, (11) turns into (13) . Now the regulator can implement the welfare optimum by setting the emission tax rate t = D E : With imperfect competition, setting t = D E does not implement the welfare optimum, because the …rms would produce too little. The regulator would need an additional policy instrument to implement the welfare optimum in this case.
If there is no environmental damage ( = 0 so that D E = 0), then from (37) and (38),
C " = 0 so that " = 1 and the welfare-maximizing output level is q w ; implicitly de…ned by:
The second order condition for welfare maximization is that the matrix
is negative semide…nite. We shall make the slightly stronger assumption that W xx is negative de…nite. This implies that hW xx h 0 < 0 for all vectors h and the determinant is positive, so that:
Totally di¤erentiating (37) and (38) with respect to yields:
with the second derivatives of W given by (40). Solving (42) and (43) using (40) and (41) yields:
Note that D E > 0; and w > 0 by (41). Thus the sign of (44) and (45) as well as of (46) and (47) below is the sign of the term in square brackets. We cannot sign (44) and (45) unambiguously, but we can use them to show that emissions are decreasing in :
The term in square brackets is negative from setting h = q " in hW xx h 0 < 0 which holds by negative de…niteness of W xx in (40).
We can also show that marginal environmental damage M D D E is increasing in :
The second equality follows from (41) and (46). The term in square brackets is positive, because P 0 0; C> 0 and the term in curly brackets is positive. The latter term is second order condition (17) for perfect competition which implements the welfare optimum
Returning to (44) and (45) and setting environmental damage very low (D E close to zero), the terms in square brackets on the RHS are respectively:
Thus with low environmental damage, both q and " decrease as the damage becomes more serious.
When environmental damage is very high, emissions are very low: E = n"q ! 0.
When " is close to zero, the term in square brackets on the RHS of (44) is
by (4) . We cannot sign this for the general case C q" 0; but for integrated technology (C q" = 0) this is positive, so that output is increasing in the severity of environmental damage as " falls to a very low level. Indeed, from (37) with " ! 0; q approaches the output level q w without environmental damage, as de…ned by (39).
When q is close to zero, the term in square brackets on the RHS of (45) is
by (5) . Again, we cannot sign this for the general case C q" 0; but for integrated technology (C q" = 0) this is positive, so that the emissions-to-output ratio is increasing in the severity of environmental damage as output falls to a very low level. Indeed, from (38) with q ! 0; " approaches unity again: the …rm does not spend anything on reducing its emission intensity.
As with emission taxation, we will conduct further analysis in Section 5 for a speci…c integrated technology to establish the behavior of these two variables for any level of environmental damage, and the conditions under which either is non-monotonic.
Finally, let us solve for the social optimum when the environmental technology is end-of-pipe (7). The …rst order conditions for welfare maximization are, from (23):
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to yields:
with:
Solving (48) and (49) yields, using (50) to (52):
The denominator on the RHS of both expressions is positive, because this is a SOC for welfare maximization, analogous to (41).
For the emissions-to-output ratio " = 1 r q , we …nd:
The inequality follows from (53) and (54). Thus with end-of-pipe technology; both q and " are monotonically decreasing in :
Summarizing our …ndings, we have:
Proposition 2 1. Emission taxation implements the welfare optimum if P 0 = 0 or with perfect competition.
In the welfare optimum:
2. Emissions E are decreasing and marginal damage D E is increasing in the environmental damage parameter ;
3. When is very low, both output q and emission intensity " are decreasing in ;
4. With integrated technology, when is very high so that E is close to zero:
(a) When " is close to zero, q is increasing in :
(b) When q is close to zero, " is increasing in :
5. With end-of-pipe technology, q is decreasing and emission reduction r is increasing in ; so that " is decreasing in : 
We do not need to specify the damage function D( ; E We shall investigate the outcome with a constant product price (where emission taxation implements the welfare optimum by Proposition 2.1) in subsection 5.1. We then move on to taxation (subsection 5.2) and the welfare optimum (subsection 5.3) when the product price is decreasing in total production Q according to:
This function satis…es conditions (1), (2) and (5), the latter in combination with cost function (55). The outcomes of these three scenarios are very similar. We provide the general solution to all three scenarios, along with the formal proof, in Appendix A.
Constant product price: Taxation and welfare optimum
We start with the case p where the product price P is constant, i.e. demand is perfectly elastic. As we know from Proposition 2.1, the regulator can implement the welfare optimum in this case by setting the tax rate t equal to marginal damage:
While the constant P scenario may seem rather unrealistic, it is worth analyzing for Since there are no interactions between …rms, we can focus on the behaviour of a single …rm that sets output q and emission intensity " facing the constant product price P and an emission tax rate t: Its emissions are given by (3) and its cost function by (55). The …rm maximizes its pro…ts , consisting of operating pro…ts minus the tax bill:
The …rst order conditions are, with respect to q and " respectively:
Solving for q and " yields: Perino and Requate (2012) , that emission intensity is always U-shaped in strictness. 15 Substuting (A2) into (A7) in Appendix A shows that the numerators in (60) are positive:
When t = 0; the …rm's output, emissions and operating pro…ts are given by:
Applying Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 from Appendix A, we see that when < P 2 =c; emission intensity is monotonically decreasing in t and output is U-shaped in t; with the turning point at " = 1 2
: When output is very clean (to be precise: when the emissions-tooutput ratio is below half the no-regulation level), it can increase again with the tax rate while becoming ever cleaner.
If > P 2 =c; output is monotonically decreasing in t and emission intensity is U-shaped in t; with the turning point atq
Thus " decreases until the point where output is so low that it is no longer worthwhile to invest in cleaner production. From (62), this point is where output is at half its no-regulation level of q p :
16 Intuitively, when < P 2 =c; production and abatement costs are low relative to the product price. As t keeps increasing, the …rm is keen to take advantage of its low emission intensity to let output increase again. This means that the …rm has to keep reducing its emission intensity as t rises; but it is happy to do so as abatement is relatively cheap.
When > P 2 =c; production and abatement costs are relatively high compared to the product price. Then the …rm does not want to produce too much or spend too much on abatement. Thus as t keeps increasing, the …rm keeps decreasing its output. When output is getting very low, the …rm can increase its emission intensity again, reducing its abatement cost as well. 2 16 Due to space constraints, we omit discussion of the knife-edge case (here: = P 2 =c) here and in the following two subsections. We brie ‡y discuss the knife-edge case in Appendix A.
Let us now interpret this result in terms of Marginal Abatement Costs (M AC).
Marginal abatement costs, de…ned for a given level of "; are then: M AC(e; ") @ (e; ") @e
The …rm sets M AC = t: When t = 0; the …rm sets M AC = 0; so that q = q p and
with q p and p given by (61). Unless " = 0; e = 0 can only be achieved by setting q = 0 which implies = 2 (1 ") 2 : We can now determine the e¤ect of decreasing " on the M AC curve. A decrease in " shifts the horizontal intercept e p = " q p Intuitively, a decrease in emission intensity " has two e¤ects on marginal abatement costs M AC as a function of emissions e. First, a lower " means that output q has to be reduced further to achieve a given emission reduction. This e¤ect raises M AC and is dominant for low levels of e: Secondly, a lower " means that a given level of e is achieved with a higher q. With increasing marginal production costs, the pro…t margin on the last unit of output, which has to be given up in order to reduce e; is lower when " is lower and q is higher. This second e¤ect reduces M AC and is dominant for high levels of e. 17 Perino and Requate (2012) do not impose the constraint that the area under the M AC curve is the same for the two technologies that they consider. However, this constraint follows necessarily from our de…nition of the integrated technology. 18 It only shows the M AC curves for M AC P = 1; since by Proposition 3 and (A2), e = 0 is achieved for M AC = t = c=P = when < P 2 =c = 1 and for M AC = t = P = 1 when > P 2 =c = 1. When " falls marginally, the M AC curve pivots clockwise around its middle point, so that the area underneath remains constant at p :
19 Since M AC = 0 at e = e p ; the pivot point is at:
The pivot point is thus at q =q p ; de…ned in (62) as the output level where " reaches the bottom of its U-shaped curve. Substituting (64) back into (63) to eliminate ", we can …nd the curve that connects all these pivot points, which is the envelope curve V (e) that gives the maximum value of M AC for a given level of e:
V (e) = P 2 4ce
(65) Figure 1 shows the envelope curve V (e) for P = c = 1.
19 Formally, the pivot point is found by setting @M AC=@" = 0 in (63).
Let us now examine with the aid of Figure 1 why " reaches the bottom of its Ushaped curve at the pivot point of the M AC curve: When t rises from t = 0, the …rm starts reducing e and "; crossing successive M AC curves on its way. Since the total tax payment is t"q; the marginal bene…t to the …rm of decreasing " is tq: Equation (59) shows that the higher is tq; the higher the …rm will set the marginal cost of reducing " and thus the further it will reduce ": Figure 1 illustrates how tq changes at the point where the …rm crosses the M AC curve for " = on the curve features q = ; which by (59) is the solution for = 20 27 : Then te is the shaded rectangle under the curve with area : Given " = ; we see that the associated also rises and the rectangle under the " = ; halfway up the " = ; which by (59) will happen for
, the …rm will not change " when t rises. For t > 2 3
; the rectangle under the " = curve decreases as t rises (with also decreasing), prompting the …rm to raise " again.
is the minimum emission intensity for q =q p : As we have seen above, this is also the pivot point for the " = 3 4 curve.
20 Figure 2 shows emissions e in (60) as a function of the tax rate for P = c = 1 and di¤erent values of (note that the axes are interchanged compared to Figure 1 ). When > P 2 c = 1; q is monotonically decreasing in t and as we have just illustrated, " is Ushaped in t; reaching its minimum at q =q p given by (62). In Figure 2 , the point where " reaches its minimum is where the emissions curve touches the q =q p curve. This curve 20 We can use an analogous method to illustrate why the lowest output level occurs at " = for and substituting this into the expression for e in (60); we …nd that the point where q reaches its minimum is given by e = (2P t)=4c. This is the curve "" = curve and increasing q below it. 21 
Decreasing price: Taxation
In the taxation scenario, denoted by subscript t; there are n …rms facing inverse demand function (56). Substituting (55) and (56) into (9), pro…ts can be written as: 21 The emission curves for > 1 also intersect the " = Firms choose q i and " i simultaneously. The FOCs for maximization are, respectively:
Substituting (55) and (56), second order condition (16) becomes:
Solving (67) and (68), the symmetric equilibrium solutions are given by:
Without environmental policy, t = 0 so that: Figure 3 illustrates the symmetric equilibrium, where (67) becomes:
On the LHS is each …rm's equilibrium marginal revenue (M R in Figure 3 ) where all …rms produce the same amount q = Q=n: On the RHS of (72) is the sum of the industry's aggregate marginal production costs cq (AM P C in Figure 3 ) and the e¤ective tax rate t" on output. When t = 0; (72) holds at point Z in Figure 3 so that each …rm sets q = q t as given by (71), total production is Q t = n q t and the product price is P t = P ( Q t )
by (56). Let us assume that for a given emission intensity level " 0 (not shown in the …gure), the regulator sets the emission tax rate at t 0 so that the e¤ective tax rate on output is 0 t 0 " 0 and the industry produces Q 0 as shown in Figure 3 . Thus creates a wedge between M R and AM P C: As rises continuously from zero to a to reduce output per …rm from q t to zero, the continuum of wedges …lls the whole area OaZ = : When output is very clean (to be precise: when the emissions-tooutput ratio is below half the no-regulation level), output can increase again with the tax rate in while output is becoming even cleaner.
If > t ; output is monotonically decreasing in t and emission intensity is U-shaped in t; with the turning point atq
Thus " decreases until the point where output is so low that it is no longer worthwhile to invest in cleaner production. This occurs when output is at half its no-regulation level of q t ; given by (71):
The intuition behind t in (73) being the critical value of is as follows. When < t ; production costs are low. Abatement costs are relatively low as well, for two reasons.
First, the cost of reducing emission intensity to a certain level is low, because is low.
Secondly, since the number n of …rms is low, each …rm has a relatively high production level. This raises the bene…t of investing in a reduction of the emission intensity of output.
As t keeps increasing, …rms are keen to take advantage of their low emission intensity to let output increase again. This means that …rms have to keep reducing their emission intensity as t rises; but they are happy to do so as abatement is relatively cheap. When > t ; production and abatement costs are high. Then …rms do not want to produce too much or spend too much on abatement. Thus as t keeps increasing, …rms keep decreasing their output. When output is getting very low, …rms can increase their emission intensity again, reducing their abatement cost as well.
Let us now interpret these results in terms of marginal abatement cost (M AC) curves.
Substituting (3) into (66), …rm i's pro…ts can be written as a function of emissions, emission intensity and the aggregate output Q i of all other …rms:
Firm i's marginal abatement costs, de…ned for a given level of " i ; are then:
Unlike in (63) previously with constant product price, …rm i's M AC depends on the choice of q j by all other …rms j 6 = i; and therefore indirectly on their choice of abatement technology " j e j =q j : This is also in contrast with …rm i's M AC (28) under end-of-pipe technology, which does not depend on the abatement technology r j chosen by the other …rms.
Since this dependence of an individual …rm's M AC on other …rms'abatement decisions limits its usefulness, we will instead make use of the aggregate marginal abatement cost AM AC for the whole industry in a symmetric equilibrium where q j = q and " j = " (and thus e j = e and E = ne) for all j = 1; ; n: From (75):
AM AC(E; ") nM AC E n ; "; (n 1)E n" = a "
When t = 0; each …rm sets AM AC = 0; so that Q = Q t n q t as de…ned by (71):
Unless " = 0; e = 0 can only be achieved by setting Q = 0: A decrease in " shifts the a Q t …lled by the wedges of in Figure   3 , as discussed above. This means that AM AC(0; ") has to move up according to:
AM AC(0; ") = a " Figure 4 shows AM AC curves for di¤erent levels of " when P = c = 1; n = 4; so that t in (73) equals
When " falls marginally, the AM AC curve pivots clockwise around its middle point, so that the area underneath remains constant at 1 2 a Q t : Since AM AC = 0 at E = E t ; the pivot point is at:
The pivot point is thus where Q =Q t = nq t as de…ned by (74). Substituting (77) back into (63) to eliminate ", the curve that connects all these pivot points is the envelope curve V (E) that gives the maximum value of AM AC for a given level of E: Figure 4 shows the envelope curve V (E) for P = c = 1; n = 4. Figure 5 shows total emissions E from (70) as a function of the tax rate for P = c = 1; n = 4 and di¤erent values of (with the axes interchanged compared to Figure 4 ).
For the values of and 20, however, pro…ts are positive throughout.
; q is monotonically decreasing in t and " is U-shaped in t; reaching its minimum at q =q t given by (74). As we have seen above, this is where the AM AC curves cross. 23 In Figure 5 , the point where " reaches its minimum is where the emissions curve touches the Q =Q t curve. The Q =Q t curve is the inverse of the V (E) curve in (78) and Figure 4 .
; " is monotonically decreasing in t and q is U-shaped in t; reaching its minimum at " = 1 2
: Solving " = 1 2
for and substituting this into the expression for E in (70); we …nd that the point where q reaches its minimum is given by:
This is the curve "" = curve and increasing q below it. 24 
Decreasing price: Welfare optimum
In this subsection we investigate the welfare optimum w, where the regulator chooses both " i and q i ; i = 1; ; n; to maximize social welfare. As …rms are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium of the game; that is, where q i = q and " i = " for all i = 1; ; n: In symmetry, welfare (23) can be written as W = nw where, from (55) and (56):
The …rst order conditions are:
Without environmental damage ( = 0 so D = M D = 0); the welfare optimum is:
Solving (80) for ", Q and E as functions of M D yields: 23 The intuition behind this result is analogous to the explanation given in subsection 5.1. 24 The curves for > 1=6 also intersect the " = : Initially, output is declining in marginal damage. When output is very clean however (to be precise: when the emissions-to-output ratio is below half the no-regulation level), it can increase again with marginal damage while becoming even cleaner.
When > a 2 =(n+c); output is monotonically decreasing in M D and emission intensity is U-shaped in M D; with the turning point at
Thus " decreases until the point where output is so low that it is no longer worthwhile to invest in cleaner production. This point is where output is at half its no-regulation level of Q w :
The signi…cance of the comparison between and a 2 =(n + c) can be explained as follows. When a is high, demand is high, so that the regulator does not want to reduce output by too much and is anxious to increase it again if possible. When and n are high, the cost of reducing emission intensity per …rm and for all …rms n is high. Then the regulator does not want to spend too much on reducing emission intensity and is happy to increase emission intensity again if possible. Finally when c is high, production is costly, again making emission reduction more e¢ cient than increasing output from the social welfare point of view.
When interpreting this result in terms of marginal abatement costs, it is useful to de…ne the social marginal abatement cost (SM AC) as a function of total emissions E = ne divided equally among all …rms. Substituting (3) into (79), welfare W = nw can be written as a function of total emissions and emission intensity:
with pollution bene…ts P B the di¤erence between the utility and the production cost of output: 
When there is no environmental damage ( = 0 so that M D = 0); the welfare optimum has SM AC = 0 in (87), so that Q = Q w ; E = E w "Q w and P B = P B W ; with Q w and W given by (82) and P B by (86). Unless " = 0; E = 0 can only be achieved by setting Q = 0 which implies P B = 0: A decrease in " shifts the point E w "Q w where SM AC = 0 to the left. The area under the SM AC curve must remain the same, because it is the di¤erence P B in pollution bene…ts between SM AC = 0 and E = Q = 0. This 26 Whereas marginal abatement costs are usually de…ned in terms of a single …rm's pro…ts, our de…nition of social marginal abatement costs emcompasses all the …rms'pro…ts as well as the consumer surplus.
means that by (82), SM AC(0) has to move up according to: Figure 6 shows SM AC curves for di¤erent levels of " when a = c = 1; n = 4:
When " falls marginally, the SM AC curve pivots clockwise around its middle point, so that the area underneath remains constant at P B: Since SM AC = 0 at E = E w ; the pivot point is at:
The pivot point is thus where Q =Q w as de…ned by (82). Substituting (88) back into (87) to eliminate ", the curve that connects all these pivot points for di¤erent " values is the envelope curve V (E) that gives the maximum value of SM AC for a given level of E: Figure 6 shows the envelope curve V (E) for a = c = 1; n = 4. for a = c = 1; n = 4 and di¤erent values of (note that the axes are interchanged compared to Figure 6 ). When > a 2 =(n + c) = 1=5; Q is monotonically decreasing in M D and " is U-shaped in M D; reaching its minimum at Q =Q w given by (62). As we have seen above, this is where the SM AC curves cross. 27 In Figure 7 , the point where "
reaches its minimum is where the emissions curve touches the Q =Q w curve. This curve is the inverse of the V (E) curve in (89) and Figure 6 .
When < a 2 =(n + c) = 1=5; " is monotonically decreasing in M D and Q is U-shaped in M D; reaching its minimum at " = 1 2
:
for and substituting this into the expression for E in (83); we …nd that the point where Q reaches its minimum is given by:
This is the curve "" = curve and increasing Q below it.
28 27 The intuition behind this result is analogous to the explanation given in subsection 5.1. 28 The curves for > 1=5 also intersect the " = 
Conclusion
Does an increasingly strict environmental policy spur on the polluting industry to invest more and more in …nding cleaner ways to produce? The answer might seem obvious, but it is not once we take the output market into account. When a stricter environmental policy leads to a reduction in output, investment in reducing the emissions-to-output ratio becomes less pro…table. Conversely, when a stricter environmental policy leads to very clean production methods, it may be possible to increase output again.
We …nd that with an integrated abatement technology (where a …rm can invest in reducing the emission intensity to a certain level), either output or the emissions-to-output ratio is a U-shaped function of the environmental damage parameter. This happens with emission taxation as well as in the welfare optimum. Thus if we see polluting output increasing or production methods becoming less clean as environmental policy becomes stricter, this is not necessarily a sign that the policy is ine¤ective (or even counterproductive) or misguided.
This issue is linked with recent …ndings in the literature that cleaner technology can pivot the Marginal Abatement Cost (M AC) curve clockwise, with the new M AC curve intersecting the old one. We …nd that when emission intensity is U-shaped, the turning point occurs where the M AC curves cross.
When the product price is constant, the de…nition of M AC is relatively straightforward: It is a …rm's decrease in pro…ts from reducing emissions by reducing output. When the product price is decreasing in total output, however, a …rm's pro…ts and thus its M AC depend on the output and abatement decisions of the other …rms. In this setting, we de…ne the industry's Aggregate M AC for the case where all …rms set the same emission intensity and output levels. For the welfare-maximizing outcome, the relevant concept is the Social M AC, which includes the changes in the industry's pro…ts and in the consumer surplus.
Although it may be optimal for environmental policy, especially for greenhouse gases, to become ever stricter over time, it is likely that policy makers are unable to credibly commit to this. An alternative could be to stimulate environmental R&D, reducing the future cost of stricter environmental policy by reducing marginal abatement costs (Abrego A government that faces uncertainty about the environmental preferences of a future government may want the …rm to adopt a cleaner production technology. Applying the analysis of the present paper, we know that a cleaner production technology comes with a steeper M AC curve. Thus with the cleaner technology in place, the future government will implement an emission level that is closer to the current government's preferred level.
Our …ndings also have implications for empirical research. We …nd that the cleanliness of production is a far from perfect indicator of the strictness of the environmental policy.
It may well be the case that stricter environmental policy will lead to less clean production.
This has implications for empirical studies which have used the emission-to-output ratio as a proxy for the stringency of environmental policy. For instance, List and Co (2000) use the ratio of pollution abatement operating expenditures to value added as one of the measures of US state environmental regulation. Ederington et al. (2005) take the ratio of pollution abatement costs to total costs of materials as their measure of stringency of US (federal) environmental regulation.
In future empirical work, it would be interesting to examine whether abatement technology for a speci…c pollutant and industry can be described as an integrated technology.
In this case, further investigation could reveal whether stricter environmental policy would lead, or perhaps has already led, to a U-shaped response in output or emission intensity.
Emission intensity is more likely to be U-shaped if production and abatement costs are high, the number of …rms is high and the size of the market is small.
A Appendix A: Integrated technology example
Lemma 1 Let each …rm's cost function be given by (55) and its emissions by (3) . Then in scenario p with constant product price, in the welfare optimum w; and under emission taxation t, the general solution has the form:
T t = t; t = a; t = 1 + n + c (A3)
T w = M D; w = a; w = n + c (A4) so that T = 0 implies:
Proof. Equation (A1) follows from substituting (A2) into (60) with constant product price p, (A3) into (70) with emission taxation t; and (A4) into (83) in the welfare optimum w:
We can now state: When T = ; e = 0 with q = 0 and " = 1:
29 Due to space constraints, we omit the formal analysis of the knife-edge case = 2 = : In this case, dq=dT < 0 and d"=dT < 0 for low T values until " = 1 2 and q =q given by (A6). For higher T values there are two solutions, one with dq=dT < 0 and d"=dT > 0; and one with dq=dT > 0 and d"=dT < 0:
Proof. Di¤erentiating q and " in (A1) with respect to T yields:
The second equality in (A8) follows from (A1). The second equality in (A9) follows from (A1) and (A6).
Emissions drop to zero either because q = 0; which from (A1) happens at T = ; or because " = 0; which from (A1) happens at T = = :
1. If < 2 = ; e = 0 when T = = ; so that by (A1), " = 0 and q = q given by (A5): For the numerator of the fraction in the middle of (A9), 2 > implies:
With " decreasing monotonically from 1 to zero, (A8) implies that dq=dT
2. If > 2 = ; e = 0 when T = ; so that q = 0 and " = 1 by (A1): For the term in square brackets in the middle of (A8), 2 < implies:
With q in (A1) decreasing monotonically from q >q (by (A5) and (A6)) to zero, We …nd that with integrated technology, output q is decreasing in the emission tax rate t for low values of t (Proposition 1.3) and can be increasing in t for high t (Proposition According to Ulph (1997) , q is constant when "(F ) = " 0 e F ; or inverting the function and normalizing " 0 = 1:
Substituting (B1) into (31) and (32), we …nd that the two FOCs are satis…ed with equality if and only if q is constant at q < q t given by:
so that " is given by:
However since " 1, (B2) and (B3) can only be satis…ed for:
and E nq : The regulator can achieve a total emission level between nq and n q t by setting t < t ; to which the …rm will respond by not abating, so that " = 1 and (B3) does not hold (McKitrick, 1999) and setting q according to:
We do not allow for integrated technology cost function (B1) in our model, because it features F 0 (1) = 1= < 0 which violates our assumption F 0 (1) = 0.
According to Ulph (1997) , q is increasing in t when "(F ) = " 0 (1 1 2 F ) 2 , or inverting the function and normalizing " 0 = 1:
This function also features F 0 (1) = 1= < 0 which again violates our assumption F 0 (1) = 0.
Then for 0 < t < t ; with t again de…ned by (B4) and (B2), the …rm will respond to a higher tax rate by decreasing its output and keeping " at 1. For t > t ; the …rm will reduce " and raise q:
Boom and Dijkstra (2009) do not model emission taxation directly, but their version of permit trading has the same e¤ects on output and emissions as emission taxation.
The authors …nd that with permit trading under perfect (Proposition 2.1) and imperfect (Proposition 7.1) competition, output is monotonically decreasing in the strictness of environmental policy. We …nd that with integrated technology, output can be increasing in strictness for high levels of t (Proposition 1.4): We shall now see that the reason for this di¤erence is that Boom and Dijkstra's (2009) cost function does not include integrated technology as de…ned here in Section 2 by C "q (q; ") = 0.
Boom and Dijkstra (2009) use the cost function C(q; e) which we shall write here as K(q; e) = K(q; "q) in order to avoid confusion with our own cost function C(q; "):
Di¤erentiating both cost functions with respect to " we …nd:
C " (q; ") = qK e Di¤erentiating both sides with respect to q yields:
C "q (q; ") = K e + qK eq + eK ee
With integrated technology, the RHS should equal zero. However, this is not possible in Boom and Dijkstra's (2009, p. 111) model, because they impose K e < 0 and qK eq +eK ee < 0:
